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The topic of this thesis is refugee status determination for humanitarian military objectors as 
regulated by the Refugee Convention. The perspective is international refugee law (IRL),1 
which is based on international legal methodology and rule of law. To achieve a result in the 
individual case in accordance with the Refugee Convention and the rule of law, both the 
substantive law and the procedural safeguards must be correctly interpreted and applied. 
 
1.1. Conscientious Objection as a Humanitarian Act 
In year 295, Maximilianus was called to serve in the Roman army, and persistently told the 
Proconsul in Numidia that because of his Christian religious convictions he could not serve as 
a soldier. He was executed, and in the end, canonized for his martyrdom.2  
Conscientious objection to military service is defined as an objection to such service which: 
"derives from principles and reasons of conscience including profound convictions arising from 
religious, moral, ethical, humanitarian or similar motives".3  
In 2011, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found the conviction of a 
conscientious objector to be a violation of the European Human Rights Convention (ECHR) 
art. 9 for the first time, in Bayatyan v. Armenia. This landmark case will be part of our 
discussion later on. In other words, the act of conscientious objection to military service has a 
long but also important recent legal history, often closely tied to religion and objecting to any 
and all use of force. Although neither of the Conventions protecting the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion explicitly mentions the right to conscientious objection to 
military service or similar kinds of participation in potential violent conduct, in time this has 
been understood to be a derivative right to art. 18 ICCPR4 and art. 9 ECHR.5 While there are 
many different grounds for objecting to military service, this thesis will focus on the case of 
military objectors who object because they do not wish to risk involvement in violations of 
international humanitarian law (IHL). One distinguishing feature of such cases is that the 
                                                
1 As regulated by the Refugee Convention with its additional protocols and other relevant sources. For full-
length references on all sources, see bibliography. 
2 Brock 1972: 13, referenced in UNHCR: "Conscientious Objection to Military Service" (2012): 2.  
3 UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1998/77.  
4 UNHCR, "Conscientious Objection to Military Service" (2012): 7. Codified in General Comment No. 22, 
paragraph 11.  
5 Bayatyan v. Armenia. 
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applicants are selective objectors, not objecting to all war, but to certain actions or reasons of 
war.  
Determining a refugee as such is always prone to causing diplomatic issues between the host 
state and the state from where the refugee is fleeing, but the determination of refugee status 
for military objectors is especially sensitive. When the moral or conscientious standard that 
forms the reason for the objection, is no longer tied to an organised religion,6 or absolute,7 it 
might be perceived as having less to do with the individual's personal lifestyle, and more to do 
with the State's political and military actions. It is no longer regarded solely as a personal 
humanitarian matter, but a matter with potential international consequences. Granting 
humanitarian objectors refugee status might be perceived as endorsing the implied criticism 
against the home State in the particularly sensitive area of national security, causing the 
determination to be imbued with political meaning and considerations.8 It may also be viewed 
as affecting the opposing state's military capability.  
The relevance of the refugee status for humanitarian military objectors only becomes fully 
apparent in light of the larger international legal context. In the aftermath of the second world 
war, a new era was founded in international law, with cooperation at the centre, principles of 
international customary law, human rights and humanitarian law. The first Nürnberg principle 
introduced individual accountability for combatants despite having acted under orders: "Any 
person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible 
therefor and liable to punishment".9 
Despite prohibitions on attacks against civilians in the Geneva Conventions,10 a large part of 
people forcefully displaced by war may not be determined as "refugees",11  because the 
conditions of "well-founded fear of persecution" in art. 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention 
requires targeting of an applicant in a way that is not automatically achieved when fleeing 
from indiscriminate attacks against civilians. One category of targeting which does qualify for 
                                                
6 For a more in-depth analysis of whether such objection is political or religious, see chapter 5.2.  
7 Selective objection is discussed in chapter 5.2.  
8 Such as it was between Sweden and the U.S. after American deserters were given humanitarian asylum in 
Sweden during the Vietnam War. Çɪnar 2020: 17; One could argue this is particularly prevalent in cases where 
the host state and the state of origin for the applicant are allies. Such is the case in Shepherd v. Germany, for 
which the outcome is not yet conclusive in German courts, and for Hinzman and Hughey v. Canada (full 
references in bibliography). 
9 Nürnberg Principles.  
10 Geneva Conventions I, II, III and IV. 
11 Cantor and Durieux 2014: 5; Hathaway, "Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection" 1991:120. 
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refugee status is sanctions against a person refusing to commit such attacks.12 Such sanctions 
are not only a violation of the human right to conscientious objection, but may contribute to 
the further violation of IHL causing a threat to civilians and their human rights. Given their 
timing and their purpose, it is only natural to see the accountability of combatants as 
intrinsically connected to IRL. Any accountability of combatants will be illusory if there are 
no real alternatives to engage in illegal warfare. Reliable access to refugee status for 
humanitarian objectors who are not recognised by their country of origin is thereby linked to 
reducing the frequency and intensity of deliberate attacks against civilians and upholding the 
laws of armed conflict. 
The political sensitivity of these cases may cause an obstruction to the rule of law in the 
determination of refugee status for the humanitarian objector. The system might be vulnerable 
to political pressure and foreign policy considerations in these cases, in addition to the more 
general political pressure on asylum systems to accept less applicants, which from time to 
time may increase.13 For the individual applicant to be treated in accordance with the Refugee 
Convention and to avoid political considerations from the host State in deciding the outcome, 
it is therefore all the more important that the legal obligations of the parties are correctly 
interpreted and applied. 
 
1.2. Focus and Structure 
The focus of this thesis is the substantive and procedural issues relevant for the determination 
of refugee status for humanitarian military objectors. It is well-established that military 
deserters objecting to violating international rules of armed conflict who flee their home 
country to avoid being forced to perform such acts or punished for refusing them, are under 
certain circumstances refugees according to the Refugee Convention.14 In this often highly-
politicised area of the law, there are however a variety of substantial and procedural obstacles 
to having this status recognized. The issues in focus are those, both substantive and 
procedural, which potentially limit the access to refugee status in such cases. The question is 
                                                
12 UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, art. 10: "No one shall participate, by act or by 
failure to act where required, in violating human rights and fundamental freedoms and no one shall be subjected 
to punishment or adverse action of any kind for refusing to do so". 
13 Çɪnar, 2020: 17-18. 
14 UNHCR, Handbook paragraph 171; Einarsen 2000: 601; Çɪnar 2020: 18; Kuzas, 1991: 478; Zimmermann and 
Mahler 2011: 432.  
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whether these obstacles are in accordance with the Refugee Convention when interpreted 
within the legal methodology of international law. 
The relevant topics discussed to answer this question includes discrimination of rank, 
incorporation of IRL in domestic legal systems, minimum requirements for the role of the 
applicant and the decision-maker in the determination process, and standards for evidence 
gathering and evidence assessment. Part of the discussion will have general application in 
refugee status determinations, for example relating to the role of the decision-maker and the 
applicant, and the general standards for evidence assessment. These topics are included 
because they are crucial for the outcome of cases for humanitarian military objectors as well 
as their wider impact. To delimit the scope of this thesis, the issues analysed are the ones 
considered most fundamental and interconnected. Issues such as causality, cessation and 
exclusion in art. 1C-F, non-refoulment, state protection and what constitutes "persecution" in 
art. 1(A)(2), as well as regional agreements which may provide refugee protection will not be 
examined beyond the extent to which they provide context to the issues discussed.  
Some might argue that parties to the Refugee Convention have full freedom in all questions 
which are not explicitly answered in the Convention. To a certain extent this rings true as the 
territorial integrity is a fundamental principle in the interpretation of treaties.15 However, the 
explicit obligations to a certain result also has implications for the process necessary to attain 
it. To then conclude that the lack of explicit mention of safeguards equals no such obligations 
for the State is not possible while adhering to the obligations of the Convention. As this paper 
will show,16 if the parties are to provide an effective protection, some safeguards are implied 
in the very wording of the Convention itself when it is interpreted according to the general 
rules of interpretation for treaties.17  
Following the introduction, chapter 2 outlines the methodology of international law and the 
relevant rules of interpretation for the Refugee Convention. An initial presentation of art. 
1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention and its purpose is given in chapter 3, which will be 
applied as a tool of interpretation throughout the paper. Chapter 4 outlines two important 
topics for the upholding of rule of law for refugees in general when implementing the 
international legal instruments into domestic legal systems. Chapter 5 analyses key concepts 
                                                
15 Preamble of the Convention of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 
16 Chapter 6 in particular, but also chapters 4 and 5. 
17 See art. 31-33 VCLT. 
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from the wording of art. 1(A)(2), and the Handbook in substantive access to refugee status for 
humanitarian military objectors. Chapter 6 outlines evidentiary standards based on 
international sources, for both evidence-gathering and evidence assessment. The final chapter 
will present the main findings of this paper and their implications for the parties.  
 
2. Methodology 
Codified in art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the primary 
sources of international law are international conventions, international custom, and general 
principles of law.18 Judicial decisions and teachings are subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.19 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 
provides rules for how international treaties should be interpreted. Article 31 states:  
"A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."  
What forms the "context" within this meaning is the text, its preamble, annexes, as well as 
agreements and instruments agreed upon by the parties in connection to the interpretation of 
the treaty.20, 21 The general rules of interpretation in VCLT acknowledges the primary and 
secondary sources from the Statute of the ICJ. The wording of the Convention in its ordinary 
meaning is the most important, and this wording must be read in light of its object and 
purpose. The purpose of the Refugee Convention will be expanded upon in chapter 3 and 
becomes an important tool in the interpretation of the Refugee Convention which is somewhat 
vague and general in its wording.  
The practice of the parties could be a source of interpretation where the wording of the 
Convention in light of its object and purpose is unclear, according to art. 31(3)(b) VCLT. A 
level of unanimity in this practice is necessary for it to be useful as a tool of interpretation. So 
far, practice on the issues that are unclear from the reading of the Convention has been 
                                                
18 Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
19 Ibid art. 38 (b). 
20 According to art. 31(2) VCLT. 
21 Notice that the travaux préparatoire are not considered part of the "context", but is regulated as a 
supplementary means of interpretation in. art. 32 VCLT. For the interpretation of many treaties such as the 
Refugee Convention this is reasonable as an overwhelming number of its signatories were not part of the 
drafting, as pointed out by Noll, "Evidentiary Assessment Under the Refugee Convention: Risk, Pain and the 
Intersubjectivity of Fear" 2005: 153. 
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divergent, but there are some cases where such practice has been able to form universally 
accepted interpretations.22 For the purpose of international law, EU directives, regulations and 
practice on the interpretation of the Refugee Convention is a relevant source of interpretation 
under (b), to the extent that it constitutes an expression of the practice in a large number of 
member states. As this thesis takes an international legal perspective, EU sources will only be 
treated as relevant within this meaning. To be used as an interpretative tool, practices must be 
within what can be read from the wording of the convention read in its context and in the light 
of its object and purpose. Practices of parties which are contradictory to this would simply be 
regarded as a widespread failure to uphold the obligations of the Convention, and in violation 
of pacta sunt servanda.23  
Legal teachings are a supplementary means of interpretation according to the ICJ,24 to be 
applied "in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to 
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the 
meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable".25 Research for this thesis therefore also includes legal writings on 
international law and asylum systems at large.26 
The last relevant element together with the context according to art. 31(3)(c) VCLT is "any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties". This 
paragraph connects the different legal systems of international law27 and acknowledges the 
reality that the parties are party to more than one international obligation, and that for any of 
these obligations to be effective they must also relate to one another. The most relevant 
sources for the question of rule of law in refugee status determination for humanitarian 
military objectors are IHL including laws of armed conflict, and international human rights 
law, especially considering that some of these rules are jus cogens, making them applicable 
between all the parties to the Convention.28  
                                                
22 For example, the interpretation of "well-founded fear of persecution". The practice of the parties has 
established that objective risk of persecution leads to a refugee status, in chapter 5.1.1.  
23 Art. 26. VCLT 
24 Art. 38 (b) ICJ.  
25 Art. 32 VCLT.  
26 For more information on the legal writings used in this thesis, see the literature list. Digital research has been 
the main tool available, with some assistance from the library at the University of Bergen for physical copies of 
books not digitally available. 
27 Vries-Zou 2020: 99. 
28 Art. 53 VCLT.  
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Sources not mentioned by art. 38 ICJ are considered "soft law". Soft law are non-binding rules 
in international law, which may nonetheless have practical value where it might be difficult to 
have all parties agree to a binding framework. For questions relating to humanitarian military 
objectors, soft law publications of the UNHCR are particularly relevant. The UNHCR was 
established by the UN General Assembly in 1950, and: “acting under the authority of the 
General Assembly, shall assume the function of providing international protection […] and of 
seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees”.29 This is reiterated in art. 35 in the 
Refugee Convention on the cooperation of national authorities with the UNHCR. For the 
question of refugee status determination for humanitarian military objectors, the Handbook 
and Guidelines No. 10 are of central importance. Despite being subject of debate,30 the text of 
the Handbook has largely remained unchanged since 1979, but the more recent Guideline 
publications complement the interpretations given by the Handbook in light of the 
international legal development.  
 
3. The Refugee Convention and its Purpose 
Refugee Convention art. 1(A)(2): 
"[…] the term “refugee” shall apply to any person who: […] owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; […]."31 
These few words define the legal basis for refugee status determination. The wording is 
broad, and somewhat vague concerning many questions regarding refugee status 
determinations. This is no unicorn in international law, as many international treaties are 
vaguely phrased to encompass the varying interests and legal traditions of their parties. 
However, as this paper will show, there are implicit answers to some of them in the very same 
wording. One initial element to note is how the wording is centered around the applicant's 
perspective.  
                                                
29 UNHCR Statute Chapter 1(1). 
30 E.g. chapters 5.1.2, 5.1.3 and 6.2.3.  
31 1967 Protocol to Refugee Convention paragraph 267: "For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term 
“refugee” shall, except as regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any person within the 
definition of article 1 of the Convention as if the words “As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 
and ...” “and the words”... “a result of such events”, in article 1 A (2) were omitted." 
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When interpreting the Refugee Convention in light of its object and purpose, the purpose of 
protecting refugees is what is conceptually most readily available. Indeed, the protection of 
refugees and their access to fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination are the 
very first words of the Convention.32 This is no accident, and as this paper will show, this 
purpose is an impactful and useful tool for interpreting the Convention. The following part of 
the preamble conversely does not concern the wellbeing of refugees, but that of the 
international community. Perhaps not surprisingly considering its authors and timing, the 
second purpose of the Convention is to prevent the "problem of refugees" from becoming a 
cause of tension between States.33 The preamble specifically mentions unduly heavy burdens 
on certain countries, and the need for cooperation both between States and with the UNHCR.  
Despite intentional vagueness in its wording it is therefore not an imposition against the 
Convention to seek harmonization in refugee law between States, but rather a prerequisite for 
achieving both the purpose of protection and cooperation. In fact, the preamble states that the 
Convention is made "to revise and consolidate previous international agreements relating to 
the status of refugees". The fact that art. 1 and 33 of the Refugee Convention cannot be 
derogated from by the parties implies that the harmonization of the refugee status 
determination and non-refoulment is especially central to the application of the Convention.34 
Many issues outlined in this paper are not addressed explicitly by the Refugee Convention, 
but answers are nonetheless implied by its wording or stand out as the only viable solution 
when the wording is interpreted in light of its purpose.  
For the protection of rule of law in refugee status determination, especially in politically 
sensitive cases such as for humanitarian military objectors, it is imperative that harmonized 
interpretations for both the substantive content and procedural safeguards are developed, 




                                                
32 "It is generally accepted that the preamble to a treaty may have some influence on its interpretation". 
Alleweldt 2011: 227, 231.  
33 Ibid. 237.  
34 Refugee Convention art. 42.  
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4.  Domestic Refugee Law 
4.1. Non-Refoulment Turned Asylum 
Fulfilling the criteria for refugee status in art. 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention, initiates the 
non-refoulment rule in art. 33. "[R]ecognition of his refugee status does not therefore make 
him a refugee but declares him to be one".35  The main question prima facie is thereby 
whether the state is prohibited from sending the applicant to their country of origin against 
their will. It is up to the state to answer this question. In implementing the Refugee 
Convention, most countries have constructed an asylum system encompassing more rights 
than that of non-refoulment, which is granted if a person can prove he or she is a refugee.  
The focus is thereby shifted from non-refoulment to asylum by asking the applicant to prove 
their right to a domestic claim within national legislation, rather than applying the Refugee 
Convention and asking the State to present reasons why this person should be expelled against 
their will.36 This has implications for how decision-makers approach their duty to gather and 
assess relevant evidence, which is shared with the applicant.37 Implicit obligations in the 
Refugee Convention for decision-makers and applicants will be analysed in chapter 6. 
 
4.2. Justiciability in Administrative Law  
Domestic asylum systems tend to form part of administrative law. Constitutional balance 
between the roles of the judiciary and the executive institutions result in some states 
restricting the competence of courts in matters of administrative law.38 Asylum applicants 
may experience restricted legal review of their case in those countries. 
One might criticise this construction, and whether the refugee determination should in fact be 
part of the administrative law. Setting that debate aside, the question which determines the 
justiciability of administrative law in these jurisdictions, namely what is a question of fact 
versus a question of law39 mirrors an underlying question when applying the Refugee 
                                                
35 Handbook paragraph 28.  
36 Popovic 2005: 35. 
37 Handbook paragraph 196.  
38 Examples include Denmark and the Netherlands, according to Vedsted-Hansen 2005: 57 and Spijkerboer 
2005: 96.  
39 Vedsted-Hansen 2005: 7-65. 
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Convention; what is a question of policy versus what is a question of law. The two should not 
be conflated, but the answer to these questions have effect on each other.  
In systems where questions of fact have limited justiciability, only questions of law are 
reviewed by courts to consider if mistakes were made. Parts of a refugee status determination 
which are not justiciable will not be reviewed using the Refugee Convention or any other 
legal instrument, making the instruments largely irrelevant. To be able to analyse international 
evidentiary standards, particularly standards regarding evidence and credibility, it is therefore 
necessary to examine what are questions of fact and questions of law in refugee status 
determinations. 
Using Danish law and jurisprudence as an illustration, Vedsted-Hansen highlights general 
concepts relevant for the distinction between fact and law in relation to international sources 
and the refugee status determination.40 Procedural rules are normally prone to judicial review, 
but there might be modifications for assessment of proof, such as in Denmark. Even so, "some 
issues pertaining to the assessment of proof can be separated from the question of individual 
credibility and the weighing of often differing general background information. Such 
separable issues may be legally regulated in a manner that would seem to allow for full or 
even intensified review of the asylum authorities’ compliance […]."41  
Vedsted-Hansen analyses a series of cases before the Danish Supreme Court, proposing that 
because the assessment of proof is connected to generally recognized standards, observance of 
these standards are justiciable.42 These include the burden of proof, benefit of doubt, standard 
of proof,43 and prognostic considerations inherent in the assessment of risk.44 Judicial review 
of such standards is thereby not excluded even when the domestic legal system expressly 
gives the decision-makers discretion regarding the assessment of evidence.  
When performing judicial review, the vagueness of the Convention cannot be read as a carte 
blanche for the parties, but must be interpreted in accordance with VCLT. Treating the 
observance of these standards as questions of law thereby opens the door for evidentiary 
standards from international sources, should they contain applicable standards or principles. 
                                                
40 Section 56 (8) of the Danish Aliens Act: "Decisions made by the Refugee Appeals Board are final."  
41 Vedsted-Hansen 2005: 59. 
42 Ibid 61.  
43 Even though this point is especially prone to national differences, Ibid.  
44 Ibid.  
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5.  Refugee Status for Humanitarian Military Objectors 
5.1. Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention 
The main question for a humanitarian military objector seeking refugee status according to 
art. 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention is whether there is a "well-founded fear of being 
persecuted […] for reasons of political opinion". The first part is the foundation for the 
refugee status determination. The second part forms the condition of causality to convention 
grounds. Because of the UNHCR's authority and the practice of the parties,45 a third relevant 
issue is whether the military action is "condemned by the international community as contrary 
to basic rules of human conduct".46 
Deserting or evading the military draft is generally criminalised. Fear of punishment for 
deserting or draft-evasion is not per se considered a "well-founded fear of being persecuted" 
in art. 1(A)(2).47 However, the Handbook makes an exception, where the military action is 
"contrary to his genuine political, religious or moral convictions, or to valid reasons of 
conscience", which could be the "sole ground for a claim to refugee status".48  
Refugee status determination differs from most civil or criminal cases in that part of the 
assessment is predictive in nature. Art. 1(A)(2) does not formulate refugee status as dependent 
on past persecution. Past events are nevertheless a good indicator of future events, and so past 
persecution creates a presumption for future persecution, but this is not antithetic.49 The next 
three chapters will analyse the content of "well-founded fear", "religion", "political 
opinion",50 and the Handbook statement on international condemnation. 
 
5.1.1. What is a Well-Founded Fear: Trepidation or Risk Assessment 
Debate on the applicant's role in asylum procedures is often centered around the meaning of 
the thrice appearing word "fear" in art. 1(A)(2). In its ordinary meaning, "fear" is defined by 
the dictionary as "an unpleasant emotion or thought that you have when you are frightened or 
                                                
45 Chapter 2. 
46 Handbook paragraph 171.  
47 Handbook, paragraph 167; Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status 1991: 179.  
48 Handbook, paragraph 170.   
49 This interpretation of the Refugee Convention is supported by the Handbook in paragraph 45.  
50 Refugee Convention art. 1(A)(2).  
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worried by something dangerous, painful, or bad that is happening or might happen".51 In 
other words, it contains both an element of emotion and of prediction.  
As outlined in chapter 2, the practice of parties could be relevant for interpreting the 
Convention. Such practice shows that objective risk of persecution can lead to refugee 
status.52 Beyond this, the understanding of "well-founded fear" is not agreed upon. There 
seem to be four dominant interpretations of "fear"; (i) trepidation evidenced by emotional 
expression,53 (ii) objective risk evidenced by collected data about the country of origin, (iii) 
forward-looking expectation of risk evidenced by seeking protection,54 or (iv) the emotive 
repercussion of risk in the individual to be proved by the refugee status determination.55  
Interpreting "fear" as trepidation is within the "ordinary meaning of the terms" pursuant to 
VCLT.56 Still, the challenges of both evidence gathering and evidence assessment 
understanding "fear" as trepidation are glaring, and conclusions based on these factors will in 
turn be lacking.57 Thereby it must be rejected based on the "context" and "its object and 
purpose" according to VCLT art. 31. This interpretation was considered applicable for a long 
time, either by itself or as an additional requirement to an objective risk, but has been widely 
discredited.58  
If the authors of the Convention wanted to convey a requirement of objective risk, the word 
"risk" or "threat" (as in art. 33 RC), could have been used.59 Although the ordinary 
interpretation as such might involve elements of threat and risk, it is not solely that. This 
interpretation of "fear" is therefore too narrow within the ordinary meaning of the terms.  
For the two last possible interpretations, there is not much difference in the definition of 
"fear" itself, but in how it may be substantiated. Both can reasonably be understood as 
referring to the expectation of risk on the part of the applicant. This understanding of "fear" 
fits within the ordinary meaning of the word as well as the context, object and purpose of the 
                                                
51 Cambridge University Press. (n.d.). Fear. In Cambridge Dictionary. Retrieved 12. October 2020 from: 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/fear. 
52 Einarsen 2000: 385, and referrals therein to Jean-Yves Carlier. 
53 Noll, Hathaway and Hicks in literature referenced below.  
54 Hathaway and Hicks 2005: 507.  
55 Noll 2005: 154. 
56 Art. 31 VCLT, chapter 2.  
57 Hathaway and Hicks 2005: 509; Noll, "Evidentiary Assessment Under the Refugee Convention: Risk, Pain 
and the Intersubjectivity of Fear" 2005: 152.  
58 Ibid; Carr, 2006: 538; Einarsen 2000: 386.  
59 Einarsen, Hathaway & Hicks and Noll in the abovementioned publications.  
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Convention. The nuances between the two interpretations lie in which procedural 
requirements are implied. This question will be further explored in chapter 6.1. 
 
5.1.2. Conscience: Religion or Political Opinion 
Disproportional punishment or discrimination in military service and the treatment of 
objectors is normally required for an objector to be a refugee.60 However, where the 
performance of military service "would have required his participation in military action 
contrary to his genuine political, religious or moral convictions, or to valid reasons of 
conscience", the "necessity to perform military service may be the sole ground for a claim to 
refugee status".61 The Handbook does not provide a precise interpretation of the threshold, but 
gives one example that should fall outside the scope ("disagreement with his government 
regarding political justification for a particular military action"), and one that should fall 
inside ("where the type of military action is condemned by the international community as 
contrary to the basic rules of human conduct").62 
Reading paragraph 172 of the Handbook might indicate that military actions condemned by 
the international community is relevant only to political objection, which would mean that 
political objectors are held to a different standard from religious objectors. This raises 
questions about the essence of conscientious objection and the principle of non-
discrimination.63  
The act of objection can be identified as religious or political by the applicant, his home 
country, or the host State. In the Refugee Convention, religion and political opinion are equal 
alternatives.64 Hence it should not matter if the objection is religious or political in nature for 
the refugee status determination. However, there are principles of sovereignty and the right of 
states to compel citizens to serve in their self-defence65 which might justify restrictions where 
the objection is strictly a matter of "disagreement with his government about political 
                                                
60 Handbook paragraph 167.  
61 Handbook paragraph 170.  
62 Handbook paragraph 171.  
63 The preamble of the Refugee Convention identifies non-discrimination as a general principle. 
64 Grahl-Madsen 1966: 238, as referred in Bailliet, 2006: 346. 
65 Guidelines No. 10 paragraph 5-6.  
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justifications for a particular military action"66 as opposed to a compromise on their inner life 
and conscience.  
Humanitarian objection is often spoken of as a matter of political opinion without explicitly 
debating whether this is the correct categorization, or as a special case.67 Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam have argued that "[r]efusal to bear arms, however motivated, reflects an essentially 
political opinion regarding the permissible limits of State authority; it is a political act".68 
The core of the human rights abuse which qualifies as persecution is "to ask asylum seekers to 
make a choice between imprisonment and violating their conscience".69  
Since Bayatyan v. Armenia in 2011, the ECtHR has found violations of the freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion in art. 9 ECHR on several occasions. The case law mainly 
concerns members of Jehovah's Witnesses, and philosophical pacifists. All cases that have 
found a violation so far have concerned so-called absolute objection to military service.70 So 
far, there has not been a case about humanitarian objection, and so it remains to be seen how 
the ECtHR would categorize the objection and how it views this type of selective objection. 
However, the Court has stated that military objection as part of this freedom applies both to 
religious "or other beliefs". In Papavasilakis v. Greece, the Court also established that a 
person does not necessarily have to adhere to an actual religion or belong to a pacifist 
organisation in order to be recognised as a conscientious objector.71 The Courts opinion is not 
an application of the Refugee Convention, but its opinions on the human rights aspect will 
influence states that are party to both Conventions. 
Bailliet argues that adjudicators appear reluctant to discuss the human family, and that when a 
person is viewed only as an individual, his values are not considered his conscience, but 
rather political opinion, which may be misunderstood and rejected.72 Hence adjudicators 
avoid discussing the differential treatment of non-religious values, a topic which could be 
                                                
66 Handbook paragraph 171.  
67 See e.g. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, 1991; Zimmermann and Mahler, 2011: 430-433.  
68 Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam 2007: 87. 
69 Ibid. 114.  
70 Guide on Article 9 ECHR, paragraph 64. The only case on selective objection before this Court is Enver 
Aydemir v. Turkey, which was rejected and did not submit humanitarian objection.  
71 Ibid. paragraph 63. 
72 Bailliet 2006: 347. 
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controversial, particularly in host countries which promote secularism and non-discrimination 
of humanistic values in other areas of society.73  
Guidelines No. 10 states that conscientious objection to military service "includes objection to 
military service based on moral, ethical, humanitarian or similar motives".74 It does not 
mention whether all of these are considered part of a religious motivation, but it indicates that 
the conscience of the applicant should be at the centre, regardless of formal categorization. 
The relationship between conscientious objection, religion and political opinion is blurry. 
From the reading of the Convention, the Handbook and the Guidelines there seems 
nevertheless to be a clear that in cases where the type of military action objected to is 
"condemned by the international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct",75 
and there is a risk of punishment for objecting, then refugee status should be determined in 
any case, even if the objection is identified as political.  
Further, the self-identification of the grounds for objection by the applicant as humanitarian 
must be regarded as something fundamentally different from a political disagreement, and 
should not be held against him by creating added requirements based on the Handbook. Such 
a practice would be placing too much importance by the decision-makers on soft law,76 and 
legal assessments of the military actions, overlooking the link between humanitarian values 
and conscience.  
Regardless of whether the military action in question is considered internationally 
condemned, adjudicators should consider the genuineness of the humanitarian objector's 
convictions, and whether such convictions are taken into account by the authorities of his 
country in requiring him to perform military service, corresponding to the assessment that is 
prescribed for religiously motivated objection in paragraph 172.  
Additional nuances between religious and political motivations connected to how selective 
objection and voluntary conscription plays into potential discrimination will be discussed in 
chapters 5.2 and 5.3. 
 
                                                
73 This point could have been deciding in Sepet v. SSHD, chapter 5.4.   
74 Guidelines No. 10 paragraph 11.  
75 Handbook paragraph 171.  
76 Çɪnar 2020: 16.  
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5.1.3. Political Statement or Legal Standard 
As argued in the previous chapter; where the type of military action is condemned by the 
international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct,77 the applicant should in 
any case be determined a refugee. The court rejections of claims by selective objectors on 
account of not meeting standards set in paragraph 171 of the Handbook makes it relevant to 
examine exactly what standard the Handbook sets by its mention of international 
condemnation. That is the aim of this chapter.  
The requirement in paragraph 171 can be interpreted one of two ways, requiring an 
assessment to be based on either: (i) political statements, or (ii) violations of IHL. The former 
interpretation has been held by courts in several countries,78 but UNHCR publications and 
domestic jurisprudence shows a development towards the latter.79 
Requiring political statements of condemnation will certainly be impacted by whether the host 
nation itself has issued such statements, but also by their bilateral relationships to the state of 
origin and other countries.80 This leads to divergence in practice between states. Many nations 
are unwilling to issue condemnations, and condemnations are often as affected by diplomatic 
and economic considerations as they are by a review of international standards.81 If it ought to 
be interpreted as requiring an international consensus, it should be noted that those are rare, 
often changing with time or made long after the actions in question took place. One could 
require condemnation by the UN, but there are many organizations within the UN, which 
would cause confusion. Questions might also be raised on what constitutes condemnation, 
causing debate around diplomatic language and phrasing. 
Interpreting "condemned" as a legal standard solves many of these issues, and provides a 
requirement more suited to legal review by the decision-makers in asylum cases. Language 
used by diplomats is not intended to regulate the outcome of asylum cases, and is not 
typically suited for that purpose. Paragraph 171 points to an abstract condemnation both in 
focusing on the "type" of military action rather than individualised action, and by referencing 
                                                
77 Handbook paragraph 171.  
78 Examples include Norway, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Bailliet 2006: 356-363. 
79 UNHCR Guidelines No. 10: paragraph 21; Zimmermann and Mahler 2011: 433.  
80 Not implying that the Court has made political priorities, Shepherd v. Germany is one example where a 
determination of the applicant as a refugee could become politicised as a thorn in the side of the US-Germany 
relationship and NATO at large.  
81 Bailliet 2006: 354. 
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"basic rules of human conduct". The Guidelines No. 10 paragraph 26-30 clearly states that the 
UNHCR intended it to be a legal standard. 
Political statements of condemnation are relevant to this assessment when they are considered 
an expression of that state's legal opinion. The main assessment is of the type of military 
action and whether the actions that the applicant testifies to as the cause of their objection 
would be contrary to international rules for armed conflict.82  
One important caveat is necessary when depicting the assessment of the military action as a 
legal one, namely the lowered standard of proof.83 Determining refugee status is not a trial 
against the country of origin.  
In Prosecutor v. Erdemovic before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), a soldier had participated in the execution of 1200 unarmed civilians, after being told that: 
"If you don’t wish to do it, stand in the line with the rest of them and give others your rifle so that 
they can shoot you". The ICTY found that "duress does not afford a complete defence to a soldier 
charged with a crime against humanity and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent human 
beings".84 Bailliet argues that the negation of this defence indicates that soldiers should ensure 
that they are never placed in a situation of duress during humanitarian violations, and the best way 
to do so is desertion or draft evasion. Otherwise, the only option is to line up with the victims and 
be shot alongside them. If such is the perspective of the international community, then it is logical 
that the asylum policies should provide protection to those soldiers who flee.85  
Concern for those attempting to avoid situations where they might be forced to commit 
human rights violations and war crimes requires to a low standard of proof. The applicant 
cannot be required to make a complicated legal analysis, and the level of risk required must 
be low.86 Paragraph 171 itself rather than demanding a direct or indirect involvement requires 
only that the objector "does not wish to be associated".87 It is useful to remind ourselves that 
the assessment is one of risk, and so there is a predictive element. This reverts the focus back 
to the applicant as the main actor of asylum process, by considering their genuineness in 
objecting to war crimes and their risk analysis for being put in such a situation, rather than a 
general judgement on their country of origin.  
                                                
82 Geneva Conventions and other relevant treaties of international humanitarian law (IHL).  
83 Chapter 6.2.1.  
84 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic paragraph 19. 
85 Bailliet 2006: 380. 
86 Chapter 6.2.1.  
87 Chapter 5.4.  
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Recognition of the lowered standard of proof separates the asylum system from foreign affairs 
by acknowledging that the successful claim of an objector is not a condemnation of their 
home country for IHL violations, but a result of the risk of future punishment for objecting to 
participate in actions which contradict their conscience. This reverts the focus from foreign 
policy back to the primary source and the primary concern for whether there is a well-founded 
fear of persecution on Convention grounds.  
The solution of a legal assessment is not only in accordance with what may be interpreted 
from the Refugee Convention and the UNHCR publications and restricts the arbitrariness for 
applicants but also makes a better fit for the judicial review of asylum cases, since most 
domestic legal systems intend their courts to function void of political consideration.88 
 
5.2. Selective Objection and Voluntary Conscription 
Objection to a type of military action which is internationally condemned in accordance with 
the Handbook,89 is necessarily selective,90 as international law cannot by any interpretation be 
said to condemn all military actions. Because such objection is necessarily selective, it is 
beside the point whether the objector volunteered for military service or was drafted. This is 
sometimes used as an indicator of the genuineness of his or her convictions where the 
objection has religious grounds.91 Although this practice has been criticised in general,92 it 
would be a particularly unreasonable argument in the case of humanitarian military objectors, 
considering that these objectors are characterised by being selective in their objection. Despite 
this fact, there are examples where the selective nature of the objection causes problems in the 
recognition of the humanitarian military objector.93 
 
 
                                                
88 E.g. the U.S. Court's mandate from Congress, according to Kuzas 1991: 472.  
89 Handbook paragraph 171.  
90 Confirmed in Shepherd v. Germany paragraph 35. 
91 Handbook paragraph 174.  
92 Mathew 2013: 186. 
93 Hinzman and Hughey v. Canada paragraph 12: the U.S. investigating officer partly based his decision on the 
negative and erroneous inference drawn from his belief that Mr. Hinzman did not claim conscientious objector 
status until after he learned he would be deployed to Afghanistan, and Mr. Hinzmans implying that he would be 
willing to conduct defensive or peace keeping missions.  
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5.3. Jus in Bello vs. Jus ad Bellum 
One issue of discrimination which is unique for humanitarian military objectors is the 
consequences in refugee and asylum law of the distinction between jus in bello and jus ad 
bellum in general international law. Two cases which illustrate this point in the context of 
refugee determination are the Canadian case Hinzman and Hughey v. Canada, and Shepherd 
v. Germany before the EU Court of Justice (EUCJ).94 Both cases concern U.S. deserters, and 
due to the considerable weight of the U.S. internationally and its close bilateral relationship 
and military alliance with both host states, it is not difficult to imagine them as politically 
sensitive. The core of the argument of both Courts is that objection to illegality based on jus 
ad bellum is reserved for higher ranking officers who would be involved and potentially held 
legally accountable for decisions on the use of force. This leaves the lower ranking soldier 
without the option to object on the grounds of the prohibition of use of force in art. 2.4 of the 
UN Charter.95 
In Hinzman and Hughey v. Canada, one applicant was deployed to Afghanistan and the other 
to Iraq, both deserting due to their opinion that these wars were illegal by international law. 
The issue of whether the Handbook paragraph 171 leads to a differentiated treatment of 
soldiers and officers in their right to conscientious objection was therefore at the core of the 
case before the Immigration and Refugee Board. In the decision of the Federal Court, Justice 
Mactavish concluded that the Board's decision was appropriate, holding that in the case of a 
"mere foot soldier", paragraph 171 only refers to "on the ground" conduct.96 She qualified a 
question for the Court of Appeal, asking for confirmation on this assessment. The Court of 
Appeal avoided the question, ruling that there was sufficient state protection in the home 
country of the applicant.  
In Shepherd v. Germany, a member of the armed forces of the United States objected to 
serving in Iraq. Shepherd enlisted for service, trained as a helicopter mechanic and completed 
one tour before returning to base in Germany. He left the army upon receiving a travel order 
to return to Iraq "believing that he must no longer play any part in a war in Iraq he 
considered illegal, and in the war crimes that were, in his view, committed there".97 He 
applied for asylum in Germany, which was rejected. The German Court deciding his appeal 
                                                
94 Ibid and Shepherd v. Germany. 
95 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations art. 2.4. 
96 Sited from the case in the Court of Appeal, Hinzman and Hughey v. Canada. 
97 Shepherd v. Germany, paragraph 17. 
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asked for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the 
interpretation of the EUQD.98 The Court did not explicitly go into the question of jus ad 
bellum versus jus in bello, but made two relevant points on the subject: 
First, that a level of personal involvement is required in the war crime, either directly or 
indirectly. The wording of art. 9(2)(e) EUQD is open to both violations of jus in bello and ad 
bellum, as it refers to art. 12 (2), which includes both. The Court stated the directive concerns 
the commission of war crimes including where: "[…] the applicant for refugee status would 
participate only indirectly in the commission of such crimes if it is reasonably likely that, by 
the performance of his tasks, he would provide indispensable support to the preparation or 
execution of those crimes".99 This requirement of individual involvement might restrict which 
persons may object against a "crime of aggression",100 causing a differential treatment 
between soldiers and officers in their right to conscientious objection.  
Secondly, the Court establishes a presumption that "no war crimes will be committed" in 
military action engaged upon pursuant to a mandate by the Security Council or based on 
international consensus.101 It would be reasonable to infer a presumption that violations of jus 
ad bellum will not take place when the military action is engaged upon pursuant to a UN 
Security Council mandate, as a military action engaged upon pursuant to such a mandate 
makes the action legal in accordance with art. 42 of the UN Charter and thereby it can never 
be a violation of the prohibition on use of force. However, most likely violations of jus ad 
bellum were not what the Court had in mind, as it used the term "war crimes", not "crime 
against peace", which is differentiated in art. 12 EUQD. Even if the reasons for use of force 
are legal, there is no automatic inference that the means and methods of war will share this 
legality. It is unclear why the Court supposes that a Security Council mandate will have effect 
on whether war crimes are committed, and such a presumption might make the case of a 
conscientious objector very demanding.102  
International accountability of combatants will be illusory if not provided real alternatives to 
engage in illegal combat.103 Nonetheless, this concept cannot be reversed. In other words, it is 
                                                
98 EU Qualification Directive: 9–26 (EUQD).  
99 Shepherd v. Germany, paragraph 46. 
100 ICC Statute art. 8. 
101 Shepherd v. Germany paragraph 41.  
102 Çɪnar 2020: 14. 
103 Chapter 1.1. 
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not a prerequisite that the combatant might be facing criminal responsibility for him or her to 
be acknowledged as an objector. There is no reason put forth by any of the cases examined 
why a foot soldier participating in an illegal war through legal methods and means, should 
have less access to refugee status, given that his or her only alternative to illegal warfare is 
punishment. 
The required connection in the Handbook between the objector and the military action is 
merely that they do not wish to be "associated".104 The focus of the refugee status 
determination is the objector's conscience, not his potential for future criminal responsibility. 
To offer differentiated protection between soldiers and higher level commanders is therefore 
discriminatory, as the soldier may hold himself morally responsible regardless whether he is 
liable under international criminal law.105 The case of a humanitarian military objector should 
therefore be treated equally with regard to the jus in bello and ad bellum distinction. The next 
chapter will examine the association required by the applicant with potential humanitarian 
violations. 
 
5.4. Type of Military Action with Which an Individual Does Not Wish to Be Associated 
Despite the presented issues of discriminating lower ranking soldiers or the restrictions 
sometimes put on selective objectors, the right to protection under the circumstances of 
punishment for refusing to commit war crimes is widely recognised.106 Consequently, it may 
come as a surprise that national procedures often conclude that such claimants cannot be 
considered refugees pursuant to relevant legislation after all,107 and an important fraction of 
cases is decided on the basis of evidentiary assessment rather than on legal issues.108 It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to exhaustively review the different national practices of the 
                                                
104 This viewpoint is supported by Guidelines No. 10, paragraph 23.  
105 Bailliet 2006: 273; Chapter 5.4. The Guidelines No. 10 supports this conclusion in paragraph 23: "it is not 
necessary that the applicant be at risk of incurring individual criminal responsibility […] rather the applicant 
would need to establish that his or her objection is genuine, and that because of his or her objection, there is a 
risk of persecution". 
106 Supra note 14.  
107 For different causes of rejection, each reflected in chapters 4 through 6.  
108 Noll, "Introduction: Re-mapping Evidentiary Assessment in Asylum Procedures" 2005: 1; Vedsted-Hansen, 
2005: 57.  
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Refugee Convention, but the fact that the national interpretations do diverge is an important 
factor in the outcome of humanitarian military objectors seeking refuge.109 
Applying a variety of legal standards can cause obstacles to the rule of law and harm the 
intended cooperation between parties as one person might be determined a refugee in one 
country but not the next.110 The wording "with which an individual does not wish to be 
associated" in paragraph 171 of the Handbook is a useful illustration.111  
In the Norwegian asylum system, the deciding factor is whether the applicant has a "real risk" 
of participating in illegal conduct. In Australia, the question is whether the applicant can show 
"a reasonable possibility that he will be personally forced to participate in such conduct, 
directly or indirectly".112 The UK changed its position, from "reasonable likelihood that the 
applicants would have been required to engage in military action contrary to basic rules of 
human conduct"113 to "are or may be required on a sufficiently widespread basis to act in 
breach of the basic rules of human conduct".114 The EUCJ implies a similar standard in 
Shepherd v. Germany.115 
In different ways, applying any of these interpretations might very well raise the bar for 
determining whether a conscientious objector is a refugee compared to the original wording 
"does not wish to be associated" in paragraph 171. Applicants thereby encounter widely 
different standards for their case based on the national interpretation. Even when legal 
standards are agreed upon, the gathering or assessment of evidence may cause other obstacles 
to refugee status, such as in Sepet v. SSHD.  
In Sepet v. SSHD,116 the UK House of Lords decided on the case of two humanitarian military 
objectors from Turkey. The applicants objected, because they did not want to participate in 
military actions including atrocities against Kurds. It was undisputed that the applicants 
                                                
109 The divergence of jurisprudence is addressed in the introduction to Guidelines No.10; One example of 
divergent practice is the multitude of different approaches to "well-founded fear", see Einarsen 2000: 384-385; 
General divergence is also referenced by Gorlick 2003: 358. 
110 One illustrative example is Norwegian returns of Afghan nationals more frequently than other countries, with 
a sudden drop from 2015 to 2017 following a policy change. UNHCR Report by Jessica Schultz, The Internal 
Flight Alternative in Norway: the law and practice with respect to Afghan families and unaccompanied asylum-
seeking children (2017), 13-15.  
111 Bailliet 2006: 365-369. Makes the comparison of the references from Norway, Australia and the UK.  
112 RRT Case No. V95/03169, [1995] RRTA 2742, Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal, 7 December 1995: 20.  
113 Sepet v. SSHD paragraph 26. 
114 Krotov v. SSHD paragraph 51.  
115 Quote from the Court in chapter 5.4. 
116 For full reference, see bibliography.  
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would face prison sentences upon return and be forced to participate in military service upon 
release. The Court rejected conscientious objection as a human right,117 holding that a 
requirement of persecutors intentions is implied in the causality condition, and that there was 
no violation if all objectors were treated the same. 
Even though a low standard of proof is established,118 and the judges briefly acknowledged 
that one way to refugee status for the applicants would be if the military service would 
include war crimes,119 there was no assessment of whether this was the case, as the judgement 
relied upon the conclusion from the special adjudicator that found "no reasonable likelihood 
that he would be forced to engage in military action contrary to basic rules of human 
conduct, even assuming that he was required to serve in a predominantly Kurdish area of 
Turkey".120 Leaving this topic without scrutiny when rejecting military objectors from a 
conflict where the violations of IHL are so widespread and well-known even at the time of 
this case121 is at best a curious and unfortunate effect of domestic application of international 
sources, and at worst a symptom of resistance in the court system against acknowledging 
violations of IHL by a military ally. 
 
6.  International Evidentiary Standards for Refugee Status Determination 
6.1. Evidence Gathering 
Suffering from having similarity to both criminal and administrative law, while not being 
exactly that, gathering and assessing evidence can be challenging in refugee status 
determinations compared to other fields of law. Not only do asylum applicants rarely have 
much in terms of hard evidence of their identity or persecution, but trauma, time, language 
difficulties, cultural differences and the situation in the country of origin make it difficult both 
to gather and assess the evidence. This is an especially vulnerable part of the protection 
offered by the Refugee Convention and cannot principally be held as something separate from 
what is suited for legal review using the Convention and other relevant sources of 
interpretation. Trauma, the extreme nature of the military actions and the relationship between 
                                                
117 Disregarding Comment No. 22 paragraph 11, and other international legal sources, arguing that neither source 
provided reasons for the recognition of conscientious objection as a human right. Lord Hoffman stated such a 
right "is not supported by either a moral imperative or international practice" in paragraph 53. 
118 Chapter 6.2.1. 
119 Ibid paragraph 52.  
120 Ibid paragraph 3.  
121 Human Rights Watch, Weapons Transfers and Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey, 1 November 1995.  
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classified, formal and informal information make gathering and assessment of evidence in 
refugee status determinations for humanitarian objectors challenging. 
 
6.1.1. Regarding the Applicant 
Building on chapter 5.1.1, "fear" within its ordinary meaning read in light of the context, 
object and purpose of the Convention should be understood as expectation of risk on the part 
of the applicant. The remaining question is then procedural: from the side of the applicant, is 
well-founded "fear" sufficiently evidenced by the applicant seeking protection, or does it 
require further participation? 
What kind of information is needed to determine whether an applicant is a refugee is quite 
often unpredictable, especially from the perspective of the applicant. The amount and type of 
information needed varies from case to case. Even though the initial application might include 
some detailed questions, it seems unlikely that the applicant would include all information 
that could possibly be relevant. Hathaway and Hicks argue that the statement of the applicant 
and all other relevant information would still be admissible in establishing whether "fear" is 
"well-founded", and they also place the applicant at the centre of the process. However, this 
seems to depend on states choosing an "embrace of the human rights-based approach",122 and 
not purely as a result of the wording of the Convention. The inclusion of applicants by this 
interpretation could be less resistant to increasing pressures on asylum systems.  
Noll's interpretation is that "fear" understood as the emotive repercussion of risk in the 
individual (interpretive alternative (iv)), includes a procedural obligation for the parties to 
allow for a communication of that risk assessment.123 As a direct consequence of the wording, 
the applicant not only triggers the refugee status determination, but is a critical and active part 
of it, as it would not be possible to assess such fear without them.124  
The description of "fear" in paragraph 37 of the Handbook supports an understanding of this 
wording as a procedural requirement,125 by placing emphasis on the applicant's statement 
above general judgements about the country of origin.  
                                                
122 Hathaway and Hicks 2005: 560.  
123 Noll, "Evidentiary Assessment Under the Refugee Convention: Risk, Pain and the Intersubjectivity of Fear" 
2005: 155.  
124 Ibid. 143-144.  
125 Handbook paragraph 37 last sentence. 
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Hathaway and Hicks find support in the historical context of the Convention for their 
interpretation (iii).126 Referring to writings about the preparatory works that "threatened" in 
art. 33 was intended as a shorthand for the determination according to art. 1(A)(2), the authors 
propose that "well-founded fear" is purely about establishing the objective risk.127 Following 
art. 32 VCLT, the preparatory works are secondary tools of interpretation. Noll argues the 
meaning of "fear" is clear, and that the preparatory works therefore hold no weight in the 
matter.128 In terms of the substantial interpretation of "fear", it seems based on the analysis 
above that Noll is right in pointing this out. However, in the procedural aspect of "fear" in 
which he is disagreeing with authors Hathaway and Hicks, the word "fear" could be regarded 
as ambiguous, evidenced by this scholarly debate taking place and diverging national 
practice.129 This makes the historical context relevant, insofar as it might be helpful. In this 
case, it helps to support the interpretation of Hathaway and Hicks that the applicant has 
sufficiently expressed an expectation of risk by seeking protection. 
Hathaway and Hicks' article raises the legitimate concern that lack of "appropriate" display of 
emotion in itself has wrongfully been used as a reason for rejection.130 The interpretation 
argued by Noll also includes an emotive element, whether that was Noll's intention or not, 
which could be misconstrued to require some display of emotion and for which Noll gives no 
explanation. With reference to the arguments laid out by Hathaway and Hicks, such a 
requirement would not be in accordance with the object and purpose of the Convention and 
has shown to be impractical.131 
Both the interpretations by Hathaway and Hicks, and by Noll are within the ordinary meaning 
of the Convention, and within what can be understood from its context, object and purpose. 
The nuances outlined above may be viewed as contrary, but can also be viewed as 
complementary. One is concerned with the obligations of the applicant, and the other with the 
obligations of the state. Hathaway and Hicks make a convincing case for why the Convention 
cannot be read as though requiring more from the applicant than to seek protection in order to 
                                                
126 Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status 1991: 74, which is frequently referenced in the article by Hathaway 
and Hicks.  
127 Hathaway and Hicks 2005: 542, and references therein to Paul Weis' commentary of the Refugee Convention.  
128 It should also be pointed out that it would be particularly inadvisable to interpret the Refugee Convention 
subjectively based on the travaux préparatoire, as an overwhelming number of its signatories were not part of the 
drafting, see Noll, "Evidentiary Assessment Under the Refugee Convention: Risk, Pain and the Intersubjectivity 
of Fear" 2005: 153.  
129 Einarsen 2000: 385, and the referrals therein to research by Jean-Yves Carlier. 
130 Ibid. 560-561.  
131 Ibid. 509.   
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have proved their "fear". Likewise, Noll makes a convincing case for why the Convention 
obligates the state not only to receive the initial application but to give the applicant agency.  
To summarise, "fear" must be understood as an expectation of risk on the part of the 
applicant. While the requirement "fear" puts on the applicant is one that is fulfilled by the 
mere act of seeking protection, it further obligates the host State to allow for the 
communication of such fear and its well-foundedness by the only person qualified; the 
applicant. Thereby, as a direct consequence of the wording, the applicant is not only a trigger 
of the refugee status determination but is a critical and active part of it.132 A process which 
does not facilitate this will inevitably lack information to make a determination and it would 
not be in accordance with the Refugee Convention to reject applications based on it. 
Where the objector is determined to be objectively at risk of being required to commit war 
crimes, or being punished for refusing so, they are a refugee.133 In any case, the applicant's 
perception of such risk must be the focus of the inquiry in order to gather as much evidence as 
possible on the reasons why the applicant fled their country of origin. A "well-founded" fear 
must then be understood as an expectation of risk that they will be required to participate in 
war crimes or punished for refusing upon return, based on experiences and knowledge about 
the past and present.  
The applicant should be considered a source of clues.134 Sometimes he or she will be the most 
important source of clues, and in other situations the applicant might not be able to provide 
many clues at all. Despite the primary consideration that the wording of the Convention, and 
the Handbook places on the applicants own assessment, it is obvious that this leaves the State 
with a fundamental responsibility to produce evidence which might substantiate that 
applicant's claim. In cases of humanitarian military objection, this means focus should be on 
the applicant's genuineness in their objection and risk assessment.135 These are subjects which 
require high-quality communication between the applicant and the decision-maker, to be 
further examined in chapter 6.2.2. 
 
                                                
132 Noll, "Evidentiary Assessment Under the Refugee Convention: Risk, Pain and the Intersubjectivity of Fear" 
2005: 143-144.  
133  Chapter 5.1.1.  
134 Popovic 2005: 52.  
135 Chapter 5.1.2 and 5.2.2.  
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6.1.2. Regarding the Decision-Maker 
Because the debate regarding the applicant's role is centred around the wording "fear", the 
wording "well-founded" is often attributed to the host State. As shown in chapter 6.1.1, what 
constitutes a "well-founded fear" must be considered as a totality, and a procedural 
requirement to involve the subject, rather than an assessment of respectively objective and 
subjective elements. The function of the State according to paragraph 37 of the Handbook is 
primarily to evaluate the applicant's statements, rather than making a judgement on the 
situation prevailing in the country of origin.  
Noll points out a problematic exercise of splitting up "well-founded" from "fear" followed by 
an identification with the host State and the applicant respectively, resulting in the State as the 
objective and the applicant as the subjective source of information. Upon review, it becomes 
clear that the information provided by the State and the applicant are human interpretations 
and assessments of future risk, making both inherently subjective. "[…] [A] move from ‘fear’ 
to ‘subjectivity’ and from ‘well-foundedness’ to ‘objectivity’ invariably adds things to the 
Convention definition that are simply not there".136 Doing so can cause a lack of critical 
review for any information gathered by the State, simply holding it up to the statement of the 
applicant as a measurement of truth.  
Principles of objectivity should not be abandoned altogether, but the subjective scope of both 
the applicant and the decision-maker must be recognised to achieve fairness and a higher level 
of information. To accomplish the purpose of the Refugee Convention to protect those that 
leave their country of origin for reasons of persecution, the State must strive to substantiate 
the assessment of risk communicated by the applicant, and to review the credibility of 
information deriving from both the applicant and other sources. 
Due to the applicant's importance in the process and the nature of the dilemma that the 
humanitarian objector is attempting to avoid,137 the decision-maker must be willing to 
consider information from the applicant about on-the-ground conditions which might not be 
accessible through formal sources.138  
                                                
136 Noll, "Evidentiary Assessment Under the Refugee Convention: Risk, Pain and the Intersubjectivity of Fear" 
2005: 144.  
137 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic in chapter 5.1.3.  
138 Chapter 6.1.3.  
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Popovic compares the asylum process to the criminal process, arguing that because of the 
potential impact the state action of refoulment has on the individual integrity, similar 
principles must be applied to legitimizing it.139 An additional similarity is the imbalance 
between the individual and state in available resources. Not only that, but the applicant which 
is truly a helpless victim of persecution is often the one that will have the least evidence to 
submit. This impacts expectations of both the applicant and the host State. Effort must be 
made to facilitate any production of evidence that favours the case of the applicant, as part of 
the State's evidence gathering.  
For the decision to legitimise State action against the individual, the decision-maker must be 
unbiased.140 The crucial first step to unbiased gathering and assessment of evidence is to keep 
the two separate. Not discounting the fact that few domestic asylum systems have enough 
resources to separate the two resembling the police and court institutions during criminal 
procedure, the conceptual structure must be similar in the asylum process. Otherwise, policy 
instructing the decision-maker in how the evidence should be assessed will easily spill over 
into the gathering of evidence, causing a distortion of the facts. Conflating the two might lead 
to a construction of the State as the objective party and the applicant the subjective one.141 
This creates an impossible standard of proof for the applicant to overcome, considering the 
State is in possession of the resources to produce evidence against the applicant, and the 
power to disregard the applicants statement. 
"[W]hile the burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and 
evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the examiner. Indeed, in 
some cases, it may be for the examiner to use all the means at his disposal to produce the 
necessary evidence in support of the application."142 Further "[i]t will be necessary for the 
examiner to gain the confidence of the applicant in order to assist the latter in putting 
forward his case and in fully explaining his opinions and feelings".143 The applicant suffers 
the risk of rejection, which means they should participate to the best of their abilities. 
However, the Handbook acknowledges that the State is oftentimes better positioned to 
substantiate statements made by applicants than the applicants themselves. To use the words 
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of Popovic, it is an "incitement rather than a burden" for the asylum seeker to be active in the 
inquiry.144 This understanding of the burden of proof corresponds with the Refugee 
Convention's purpose of providing protection for those who leave their country for reasons of 
persecution.145 The State cannot then act like an adversary but must investigate and then take 
on the role of adjudicator. 
 
6.1.3. Impediments to Fact-Finding Caused by Classified Information 
For humanitarian military objectors, it is in the nature of the case that authorities of the host 
State cannot approach authorities in the country of origin for verification.146 Not only that, but 
the true substance of the applicant's statement about the military actions and the potential 
persecution might only be evidenced by said authorities' classified records.  
When objectors flee from active duty or after first having served for a period of time, their 
communication with the host state in processing the application might cause suspicion or 
potential persecution for revealing military secrets upon return and become an added risk. 
This must be taken into consideration by the decision-maker in the assessment of objective 
risk, regardless of whether the applicant argues that point or the fact that their statement is 
treated as confidential.147  
Military records are secretive for the purpose of military strategy, and political considerations. 
Governments go to great lengths to conceal any possibility of violations against IHL. The 
case against Katherine Gun is illustrative. Gun, a translator working for the Government 
Communications Headquarters in the UK, admitted to leaking information about an American 
request to produce compromising information on the members of the Security Council before 
the vote on the prospective invasion of Iraq in 2003. The UK still holds that they chose not to 
prosecute because there was "not sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction",148 
despite her having admitted to the leak and her only defence being one of necessity due to 
violations of IHL. The prosecutor later told reporters the case was dropped because Gun 
"could only get a fair trial if we disclosed material to the defence that would compromise 
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national security".149 Her defence holds that the choice not to prosecute was made not to 
expose information that might incriminate members of the government. Regardless of which 
explanation is true, it is a useful illustration that classified information can be problematic to 
deal with as a source of evidence. 
Gathering evidence to determine refugee status for humanitarian objectors can include 
information from a variety of formal and informal sources, and the value of different sources 
must be assessed with regard for their context. 
 
6.2.Evidence Assessment 
"Evidentiary assessment constitutes the glue that keeps procedural and substantive law 
together […] assessment of fact must be in correspondence with both the type of procedure 
and the substantive law if the procedure is to provide with an effective protection".150 
Considering the challenges outlined above, in many cases there is not enough evidence even 
when both the applicant and the decision-maker have exhausted their resources to produce 
evidence. There is no explicit guidance in the Refugee Convention for the outcome in such 
situations, but the wording read in its context, with regard for the object and purpose of the 
Convention provides some implicit guidance, with help from soft law interpretations by the 
UNHCR and developments in related fields of international law. 
 
6.2.1. Standard of Proof  
The purpose of the Refugee Convention is protection.151 In refugee status determinations, the 
result is potentially high-risk for the applicant, there is often a lack of conclusive evidence, 
and there is a degree of uncertainty because of the predictive nature of the assessment. 
Keeping in mind that the obligation of the Refugee Convention is one of non-refoulment, the 
collective implication of these elements infers a low standard of proof for the applicant to be 
determined as a refugee. 
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As mentioned in chapter 2, consistent practice is a relevant tool of interpretation. This general 
low standard of proof in the refugee status determination is one thing most of the parties to 
the Convention seem to agree on. Goodwin-Gill commented on this widespread recognition 
of "degrees of likelihood far short of any balance of probability" almost 25 years ago.152 The 
UNHCR also noted this consensus.153 The British standard applied is a "reasonable degree of 
likelihood", the American standard is "a reasonable possibility",154 and Australia and Canada 
apply similar formulations. Substantially identical standards are also applied in Norway.155 
In the "theory of the three scales", Carlier presents an illustration of the three central elements 
to the refugee status determination (risk, persecution and proof) as a telescopic ladder.156 To 
reach the standard of proof, all three must have a minimum extension, but not the maximum 
extension of all three. If the risk of persecution is high, the gravity of the persecution and the 
evidence can be lower, and vice versa. For the case of humanitarian objectors, the gravity of 
the persecution is high because in addition to violating their right to object, that violation 
involves violating others. The potential damage to the human rights of others ought to be 
taken into consideration when assessing the gravity of the persecution. 
 
6.2.2. Assessing the Statement of the Applicant 
General principles of law dictate that the fact that the refugee status determination is an 
assessment of risk impacts the refugee status determination at every level, as assessing future 
risk is fundamentally different from assessing evidence of past events.  
The obligation to assist the applicant's risk assessment157 requires the decision-maker to 
facilitate high-quality communication. Consistent development of standards for assessing 
testimony has been lacking in refugee law,158 but progress has been made in international 
criminal law. Standards developed in international criminal tribunals can be both relevant and 
useful to apply in refugee law, because both systems deal with testimony about violations of 
IHL, human rights abuse and similar inter-language, inter-cultural challenges.159 As the 
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burden of proof in any case will be much higher in criminal cases, there is no evident 
disadvantage to applying them, and the asylum process could gain a more consistent 
framework for how to deal with the statement of applicants, it is hard to argue against this 
point.  
Kagan's comparative analysis shows that credibility assessment is often centered around four 
main criteria; demeanour, consistency, accuracy and corroboration.160 These are mainly 
derived from national criminal procedures for testimony of witnesses,161 which accounts for 
the disparity between them and the standards from international criminal law.  
The primary tool in inter-language and inter-cultural legal proceedings is language translation. 
What the Trial Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Yugoslavia 
found is that language translation must also be conducted in context.162 This requires a 
cultural 'decoding' when cultural differences between the decision-maker and the applicant 
might cause misunderstanding or mischaracterization of the applicant. In the Akayesu case in 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Trial Chamber noted "expert testimony 
that described the cultural trait of Rwandans not to answer questions directly, particularly 
when concerning delicate matters. Likewise, the difficulty of specifying dates, times, distances 
and locations, as well as the inexperience of witnesses with maps, film and graphic 
representations, were noted as not being construed as necessarily having an adverse affect on 
credibility".163 The Handbook also includes the clearing up of inconsistencies and 
contradictions in the obligations of decision-makers.164  
The Committee Against Torture (CATC) also developed a set of standards for evaluating 
human rights testimony. One of these standards is the importance of distinguishing between 
inconsistencies and inaccuracies in testimony relating to core and peripheral facts. 
Inaccuracies relating to facts that are peripheral to the applicant's experience have less 
probative weight, and are found not to impair the general truthfulness of a claim.165 
Dealing with increasing pressure on the asylum system and policy aiming at restricting the 
total number of positive outcomes in refugee status determinations, criteria to methodically 
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disprove applicant testimonies are appealing. It is easy to understand how the main criteria 
found by Kagan provide a welcomed method for decision-makers. Nonetheless, such criteria 
must take into consideration the type of process the refugee status determination is. The 
findings of international criminal law institutions suggest that these criteria are not useful.  
Assessing the statement of the applicant, the same concern for language in context, and to the 
distinction between inconsistencies or inaccuracies relating to core facts versus peripheral 
facts should be made as in the international criminal tribunals and the CATC. Humanitarian 
objectors could be impacted by trauma, and cultural taboos on the content of the war crimes. 
Assessing the applicant's statement, efforts must be made to provide opportunities to clarify 
and explain prima facie inconsistencies and inaccuracies, rather than dismissing statements by 
assuming that inaccuracies and inconsistencies are caused by dishonesty. 
 
6.2.3. Benefit of the Doubt and Credibility Assessment 
The discussion surrounding the concept of "benefit of the doubt" in international refugee law 
is linked to the UNHCR's statements in paragraph 196, 203 and 204 of the Handbook. 
According to paragraph 196 it should be applied when independent research by the decision-
maker is not successful or statements are not susceptible of proof.  
Paragraph 203 and 204 elaborate upon 196: "After the applicant has made a genuine effort to 
substantiate his story there may still be a lack of evidence for some of his statements. […] it is 
hardly possible for a refugee to “prove” every part of his case and, indeed, if this were a 
requirement the majority of refugees would not be recognized. […] The benefit of the doubt 
should, however, only be given when all available evidence has been obtained and checked 
and when the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant’s general credibility". 
The phrase "benefit of the doubt" has been interpreted as an expression of the generally 
lowered standard of proof, corresponding to what is implied by the Convention in itself, and 
accepted by its parties.166 The Handbook statement on the benefit of the doubt as dependent 
on a positive credibility assessment has therefore caused some confusion.167 
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In some cases, these paragraphs have been interpreted to mean that the general low standard 
of proof168 does not apply in cases where the applicant's statement is considered to lack 
credibility.169 Following this interpretation, credibility becomes the bottom line of the 
assessment, because if a lack of credibility is found, it will lead to a heightened standard of 
proof very few refugees would be able to meet due to the nature of the case. It is unclear how 
the assessment of credibility differs from the assessment of evidence,170 how it relates to the 
standard of proof implied by the Convention or the Handbook statement that decision-makers 
"must apply the criteria in a spirit of justice and understanding and […] should not, of course, 
be influenced by the personal consideration that the applicant may be an 'undeserving 
case'".171, 172 
As outlined by chapter 2, the Handbook is not binding, but has a special role in the 
interpretation of the Convention. It should not be disregarded, but the Handbook must be 
understood as a merely interpretative tool confirming and elaborating upon what is already 
explicitly or implicitly stated by the Convention. Interpreting the Handbook as introducing a 
new, second standard of proof which in practice overrules the standard of proof implied by 
the Convention runs counter to the general rules of interpretation for treaties, and causes more 
confusion than clarity. The interpretation of the "benefit of the doubt" therefore merits further 
exploration. 
The phrase "benefit of the doubt" is defined as "the state of accepting something/someone as 
honest or deserving of trust even though there are doubts".173 Reading the statements of the 
Handbook in paragraph 196, 203 and 204 as an interpretative tool to the primary source, I 
would argue a more reasonable interpretation is one where the Handbook statement on the 
benefit of the doubt simply confirm what is already stated by the prohibition of refoulment.174  
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As mentioned in chapter 4.1, the obligation derived from the Refugee Convention is a 
prohibition of refoulment and thereby mainly concerned with that result. If the decision-
maker does not know whether there is a well-founded fear of persecution for Convention 
grounds, the Convention implies that the applicant cannot be rejected. The Handbook 
statements must therefore be understood as confirming the low standard of proof; where there 
is not sufficient evidence to conclude the application, the applicant must be accepted even 
though there are doubts, as indicated by the ordinary meaning of the phrase. 
This interpretation is supported by the fact that giving a false statement is not grounds for 
exclusion in art. 1 C-F of the Refugee Convention. Thereby, one statement or the applicant's 
testimony in its entirety may be found to be a lie, but if the evidence shows that the applicant 
is at risk of persecution on Convention grounds, there is no added requirement of 
truthfulness.175 Interpreting the Handbook as adding an assessment of credibility which 
determines a possibly heightened standard of proof through a soft law instrument would not 
be reasonable when the Convention gives no such indication. 
The credibility assessment is a safeguard against cases where there is a lack of evidence and 
the statement of the applicant is non-coherent, implausible or runs counter to generally known 
facts.176 By this, it is acknowledged that even with the lowered standard of proof, a lack of 
evidence cannot on its own determine the refugee status; there is also a minimum requirement 
to general credibility. This does not shift the standard of proof, which must still be low. 
However, it is in accordance with the shared responsibility of the applicant to take active part 
in the gathering of evidence,177 and certainly to not make efforts to destroy or obscure 
evidence, to hold these minimum requirements. In summary, the connection between the 
benefit of the doubt and the credibility assessment comes down to this: where there is doubt, 
and that doubt is not the fault of the applicant, the benefit of the doubt shall be given. 
In assessing credibility, the decision-maker must apply the same low standard of proof, and 
the standards for assessing the statement of the applicant as outlined in chapter 6.2.2. The 
assessment of credibility is limited to evaluating whether the applicants statement is 
"coherent", "plausible" or "runs counter to generally known facts" and should not be used as 
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an all-encompassing subjective assessment of the applicant's motives or deservedness.178 It is 
also worth noting that the target of credibility assessments are the statements, not the 
applicants. If part of the statement is found to lack general credibility, this should only impact 
that part, and it cannot be transferred upon the applicant or to otherwise credible statements 
made by the applicant.179 
Should a lack of general credibility be found within these standards, it is only a possible 
reason for rejection after the gathering of evidence is exhausted and there is no conclusion to 
be drawn from it. To halt the search for evidence substantiating the applicant's statement 
before exhausting the available sources because parts of the information that the applicant has 
provided is viewed as incoherent, implausible or counter to generally known facts is not in 
agreement with the Convention or the Handbook. If one statement or a part of it is found to 
lack credibility, this impacts its weight in the assessment of whether there is a well-founded 
fear of persecution for convention grounds, as in any other field of law, but it does not alter 
the standard of proof applied. 
Refugee status for humanitarian objectors is deemed appropriate exactly because of the 
brutality and extraordinary character of their situation. Stories told by applicants are often of a 
brutal reality different from the decision-makers own experiences of what is probable. The 
"adjudicator is asked to give credence to the incredibility of evil".180 Stories of the time in 
military service before deserting or from living as civilian in an area affected by the IHL 
violations in question might sound improbable to a decision-maker without being so. It is 
especially important that the benefit of the doubt is applied when assessing evidence in these 
situations. 
 
7. Concluding remarks and thoughts for the future 
As this thesis has shown, the rule of law in refugee status determination for humanitarian 
military objectors face multiple obstacles. Incorporating the Refugee Convention into 
domestic law may cause conflicting and sometimes erroneous demands on the applicant,181 a 
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lack of appropriate legal review182 and even possibly wrongful interpretation of international 
refugee law.183 Accelerating and streamlining national asylum systems is incompatible with 
policy by the states to restrict the number of people determined to be refugees, if they are to 
meet the obligations of the Refugee Convention. 
To correctly apply the Refugee Convention, refugee status determination for humanitarian 
military objectors should be centered around the applicant's risk assessment184 and whether 
their objection is genuine.185 Regard must be had as to the difficulty in producing evidence.186 
A low standard of proof should be applied to all parts of the process187 and without 
discrimination.188 Assessments of credibility should be made of individual statements, not the 
applicant,189 and with regard to the low standard of proof. Where there is doubt after 
exhausting the available evidence, and that doubt is not the fault of the applicant, benefit of 
the doubt shall be applied.190 
The political problem of dealing with humanitarian military objectors must be solved by the 
application and development of legal standards acknowledging that the subject of the 
determination is the applicant's need for protection, not the interests of the State they have 
fled.191 The Refugee Convention must furthermore be applied in accordance with standards 
for inter-language, inter-cultural testimony consistent with similar areas of human rights and 
international law,192 and by decision-makers acting as independent and impartial investigators 
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